This article explores the selected cases of the biographies of right-wing supporters from a larger sample of narrative interviews with young (18-35 years old) people in Poland and Germany. In the existing literature, we can find the socio-economic explanations of the sources of the right-wing turn (related to economic deprivation, precarisation, social exclusion, labor market competition with immigrants and others), as well as cultural explanations connected with new identity politics, symbolic exclusion and divide between society and political elites, the disembedding from previously solid communities, and the fear of new risks related to the inflow of cultural Others. Despite notable exceptions, it is rather uncommon to discuss in this context the actual biographical experiences of rightwing and far-right supporters. In the article, we take a closer look at four biographical cases of people declaring their political support for far right parties. The analysis of the cases leads to the distinction of socio-economic and socio-political pathways to right-wing populist support.
among people aged 18-30. Kukiz'15, which represents newcomers to the parliament unified under "anti-systemic," anti-elite, and nationalistic slogans, was supported by 19.9% of those aged 18-30 (as compared 8.81% votes acquired in the final results) and KORWIN, a Eurosceptic party led by Janusz Korwin-Mikke known, among others, for his radical anti-feminism, was backed by 16.8% of youth (4.76% in final results) (IPSOS 2015) . In Germany, a historical turning point was the entry of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), a farright, anti-immigration, and Eurosceptic populist party to Bundestag in 2017, when it won 12.6% of votes. According to exit polls (Der Bundeswahlleiter 2017), 8% of people aged 18-24 supported the party.
According to the studies, the share of young people in Germany expressing rightist attitudes and hatred towards groups such as asylum-seekers, long-term unemployed, or homeless is rising and could be as large as 39% of those aged 16-30 (Zick, Küpper, and Krause 2016:57) .
The most of existing analyses of the support to the new right-wing populism are based on large quantitative survey research and, often qualitative, discourse analysis of media presence of populists parties. This article acknowledges the relevance of discourses understood as "the social activity of making meanings with language and other symbolic systems in some particular kind of situation or setting" (Wodak and Krzyżanowski 2008:6) . However, it also addresses an appeal for more internalist perspective in qualitative research on the phenomenon of rightwing populism focusing on the subjective (and reflexive) perspective of participants and supporters of right-wing parties and movements (Goodwin 2006; Blee 2007; Kajta 2017) . Therefore, it follows the tradition of biographical research on right-wing radicalization (Inowlocki 2000) in order to understand the role of socio-structural conditions, as well as culturally mediated subjective interpretive practices for the growing support for right-wing parties in Poland and Germany. It is assumed that biographies are not merely reflections of structures provided by the society, but they are also the expressions of narrators' individual agency and reflexivity (Mrozowicki, Turk, and Domecka 2013:30-31) . As such, they can help to understand the emergence of right-wing views in the context of biographical experiences and identities.
In the article, we discuss four selected cases of biographies of right-wing supporters from a larger sample of young (18-35 years old) precarious workers in Poland and Germany collected in 2016-2017 within the DFG-NCN supported PREWORK project. We understand precarity, following Kalleberg (2009:2) , as a relational concept pointing to "employment that is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky from the point of view of the worker." Thus, precarity cuts across class structure (Dörre 2003 ) rather than constitutes a single, "new social class," the precariat (Standing 2011) . The young precarious workers studied represent a variety of social classes as indicated by their economic and educational resources. What they share are employment conditions marked by insecurity in contractual terms (non-standard or informal employment or unemployment) and economic terms (low or irregular source of income). In the body of the article, following a discussion of the existing explanations of the support for the far right in both countries, we analyze four biographical cas-es selected in more detail. Our goal is to answer the central research question, namely, what is the relationship between narrators' biographical experiences in the sphere of work and beyond it and their support for the agenda of right-wing parties and social movements.
Explaining Support for Right-Wing Populism in Poland and Germany
There are multiple ways to explain the right-wing sympathies among young people. They include the references to the need of social protection by the losers of globalization and modernization (Dörre 2003; Kalb 2011) in the context of the crisis of social-democracy (Nachtwey and Jörke 2017) and the expansion of precarious (unstable, short-term, low paid) employment (Standing 2011) , the rise of cultural anti-liberalism and the rejection of cosmopolitan and post-materialistic values (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Fraser 2017; Kajta 2017) , latent racism, xenophobia and authoritarianism (Heitmeyer 2018) , and "new racism" which replaces "racist categories by cultural ones" (Lentin and Titley 2011) . Other approaches point to the disappointment with democracy and its liberal elites which are criticized by both the eroding middle and impoverished popular classes (e.g., Zick et al. 2016 ; Gdula 2018) . Simplifying the existing approaches, they can be divided into (1) socio-economic explanations focusing on the mechanisms related to broadly understood precarisation, (2) socio-political explanations referring to the perceived alienation of political elites, and (3) socio-cultural explanations pointing to cultural changes in late modern societies, in particular the conflict between fundamentalist and postmodern values, which in turn is clearly visible in the contradiction between populism and cosmopolitan liberalism (Inglehart and Norris 2016:22) .
The existing research makes use of the aforementioned explanations to discuss the successes of right-wing populist parties in Poland and Germany.
In the case of Germany, in the early days, the political program of AfD was mainly EU-skeptic. However, in the last parliamentary elections, it focused its claim on anti-refugee policy. More than 60% of AfD voters claimed that their decision was based on disappointment with other parties and only 32% claimed that they supported the political program of AfD (Infratest Dimap 2017). AfD was able to mobilize a large number of non-voters or first-time voters.
AfD voters show a number of characteristics. They perceive themselves as socio-economically deprived (Tutic and von Hermanni 2018), show a low trust in democracy and the current government (Ripple and Seipel 2018) , and/or have illiberal, right-wing ideas (Lengfeld 2018) . They are above-the-average male, living in the new federal states, and often older people living in the countryside (Franz, Fratzscher, and Kritikos 2018) . The most recent debate mainly focuses on socio-economic explanations for the rightwing support of which level is claimed to be different among the members of various social classes (Nachtwey and Jörke 2017; Lengfeld 2018) . Especially blue collar workers in West Germany would long for the re-establishment of the social market economy of the 1970s and those in East Germany would regret the loss of the community of workers in the former DDR (Sauer 2018) . Politically, the rise of the far right is seen as a new emergent divide between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism which goes beyond that of the (traditional) left and right (Merkel 2017) . Socio-cultural explanations focus on the loss of the "pride" and recognition of the "little man on the street" who mourns the loss of traditional cultural norms, especially gender ones (Sauer 2018) , as well as a continuity of authoritarian character in German society (Heitmeyer 2018) and, in particular, a fear of immigration (Lengfeld 2018) .
The socio-political explanations are less prominent at the moment in the German debate (Ripple and Seipel 2018) .
In Poland, the electoral success of right-wing populist parties is explained by their neo-authoritarian appeal offering various sections of the Polish society and opportunity to join a national community in opposition to cultural Others, liberal and EU elites, feel national pride and symbolic cultural significance (Gdula 2018) , the political organization of anger of those excluded in the course of transformation (Ost 2005; Kalb 2011; Pierzchalski and Rydliński 2017) , the weakness of left-wing alternatives, limited legitimacy of liberal elites, and the relevance of social program of PiS appealing to the disadvantaged sections of the society (Śpiewak 2010). One of the popular explanations of the sustained support for Law and Justice, in particular among its liberal critics, is related to political clientelism in which the party, in power since 2015, offered the underprivileged strata and classes in Poland tangible economic advantages which helped to secure their backing despite anti-liberal reforms pursued in the country (e.g., income support for families with two and more children "500 Plus" or policies aimed at limitation of civil law contracts [cf. Kajta and Mrozowicki 2018] ). Yet, regardless of workers' friendly policies, the results of existing studies are rather ambiguous as far as the social profile of the PiS supporter is concerned. According to the analysis by Gdula (2018) and his research team, the PiS discourse, based on the strong criticism of the liberal elites and anti-establishment attitudes, in combination with its socio-economic reforms, has found favorable context across various segments of the Polish society.
The support for right-wing populist ideas in the youngest cohorts of voters varies in Poland and Germany. While the electoral support among those aged 18-30 was high in Poland, the majority of the AfD voters in Germany were above 35 years old.
However, as we have shown in an earlier study (Lorenzen et al. 2018) , even though the perception of one's own precarity as a transitional phase of youth might have made the youngest people less supportive of right-wing parties, once they realize that precarity is an internal aspect of their working lives and their hopes for upward mobility cannot be met, their turn to the right becomes more probable.
Both in Poland and in Germany, there are various approaches to explain the spread of rightist opinions among young people. First, it is suggested that young people are generally less interested in politics than other age cohorts and in case they turn into the public sphere, they tend to search for parties and social movements with a more radical outlook (Messyasz 2015) . As many of them have still no established political viewpoints, they are particularly susceptible to populist publicity campaigns offering simple, dichotomized vision of the world (e.g., the "people" vs. the "establishment"). Presenting themselves as "apolitical" (Szafraniec et al. 2018:285) often means being against the mainstream politics dominated by centrist and liberal parties in the not-so-distant past. Secondly, the spread of farright opinions among young people is interpreted as a strategy for dealing with "fears and crises of orientation," typical of their age (Hanesch 1994:39; Szafraniec 2012; Jurczyszyn 2014) and searching for stronger points of reference and identity. For Heitmeyer (2018) , the increase in extreme rightist views among young people can be explained by, among other things, the disturbed transitions to adulthood in which achieving economic independence is increasingly difficult. For Szafraniec and colleagues (2017:285) , the popularity of right-wing movements and parties among young people in European countries needs to be explained both by their political disorientation and the loss of trust in political elites.
Regardless of the types of explanations, they share some flaws, including, most importantly, the difficulty to explain why it is only in some cases that the conditions of economic uncertainty or, more broadly speaking, existential insecurity among young adults contribute to the emergence of right-wing rather than left-wing views. In this context, it is clear that accounting for the support of right-wing populist parties among young people requires adapting "theoretical sensitivity" (Glaser 1978) which combines various approaches. Certainly, the turn to right-wing ideologies depends on their availability in local contexts as a part of the "repertoires of contention" which draw on "the identities, social ties, and organizational forms that constitute everyday social life" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015:20) . Since liberalism and left-wing views are often identified by right-wing parties as dominant ideologies in Eu-rope, the right-wing starts to be seen as the main alternative to what is seen as the existing, hegemonic order. This effect is magnified if socialist discourses are considered as a part of corrupted ancien régime, as in the case of many Eastern European countries (Ost 2005) . However, as argued by Dörre (2006) and Sommer (2010) , as well as the advocates of internalist perspective in the analysis of far-right activism (Goodwin 2006; Blee 2007) , in order to understand the increase in right-wing attitudes it is not enough to describe the macro-social and cultural opportunity structure. It is necessary to take into account the subjective perception of their situation by young people themselves. This is where our analysis of young workers' biographical experiences in Poland and Germany has its roots. Their life stories, the way of telling and justifying life decisions let us better understand the narrators' worldviews and reasons for supporting right-wing politics.
Methodological Background
The empirical research used for the purpose of this paper is based on the data acquired in the Polish-German study on young people aged 18-35 in non-standard employment, unemployed or precarious forms of traineeship and vocational education trainings. In total, we collected 123 biographical narrative interviews with young people in Poland (63) and Germany (60). The data were collected in the locations differentiated by their economic dynamic and situation: four middle-size cities in the "new" Out of the larger sample of interviews with young workers, for the purpose of this paper, we decided to focus on those who express support for rightwing populist parties and social movements. For this purpose, we operationalized the support of right-wing populist parties and social movements by adhering to at least two out of three criteria: During the fieldwork, we tried to access these categories of young people in various ways: through personal contacts (the acquaintances of acquaintances), attempts to contact nationalist organizations via emails and social media, and, in Germany, visiting AfD stands during electoral campaigns and contacts made with football supporters. However, there was rather limited success in reaching the supporters of populist far right. In Poland, we collected three cases of activists who declared participation in demonstrations and marches organized by far right groups and met one of the additional criteria.
In addition, there were 13 cases in which at least one of the aforementioned conditions was met. In Germany, three cases of AfD supporters were collected.
The German sample also includes four more cases which do not meet at least two criteria of right-wing populism as operationalized in this article, but they show signs that suggest at least a latent racist attitude or strong authoritarian ideas. Schütze (2008) and the grounded theory methodology (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978) , including open coding, selective coding, and memo writing.
For each interview, we reconstructed biographical portraits and developed extensive analytical memos which are summarized in the next part.
The Analysis of Four Cases of Right-Wing Supporters
The analysis carried out for the purpose of the entire project revealed that regardless of political orientations, narrators' statements about "politics" did not appear in the center of their extempore narrations (the 1 st part of the interview) except for a limited number of cases in which they were directly involved in social movements or trade union activism (Mrozowicki forthcoming). It was not surprising in so far as we knew from the existing research (e.g., Szafraniec et al. 2017 ) that in all advanced countries "[v]oter turnout among young people tends to be low, relatively few belong to political parties and, in surveys, they tend to express a low level of interest in national politics" (Furlong 2013:214) . Therefore, analyzing extempore narratives and accounts in the third part of interviews, we paid attention to indirect ways in which the political issues implicitly emerged in the modes of constructing their accounts by our young narrators.
In doing so, we assumed that declared anti-political stance and biographical irrelevance of politics might in some cases lead to critique of specific aspects of the political system (Messyasz 2015:75) .
Similarly to our larger sample, extempore narratives of right-wing supporters did not include direct ref- (2) Yes, so the first four, five years I can't say much. This cost as well, you had to pay for the instrument, there were problems with my brother, who was on detox later… but was still aggressive. We had to escape the house with my mother, go to my aunt, live there for some time until my brother calmed down
(2). This is how it all went down and down (5).
The idyllic picture of family life marked by the family plans of social advancement through entrepreneurship gets broken due to a range of uncontrollable events. As the result of some kind of "failed project" of her parents (investing in her education and cultural capital, running own business) and family problems (separation, brother's drug addiction, mother's illness) Marianna is left without the support and, as documented in subsequent parts of the interview, attempts several times to develop life projects on her own, quite often painfully learning by mistakes, but also acting against social expectations ("I just do things to spite everybody").
As the teenager Marianna starts taking light drugs and "legal highs" (dopalacze), explaining it by family situation; she also drinks quite a lot of alcohol, steals some jewelry from her mother which ultimate- does street workouts, sometimes also giving some shows for children. As for the future, besides professional plans (which "will change many times"), he dreams of having a full family; indicating, likewise in earlier stories, a dream of "normality": "to have a son, plant a tree, and build a house [laughter] ." Considering himself as a socially advancing self-made man, he successfully capitalizes various occupational experiences and turns them into assets to be used for the sake of economic upgrading of his situation. Marian also considers himself a practical man who "likes to do their job well," not even being passionate about it, but striving for good earning and respect at work. This resembles some features of traditional workers' habitus (Bourdieu 1984) which stayed as important refer-ence point for Marian due to his origins, despite the experience of economic advancement.
The combination of working-class dispositions to work hard and do one's job well with the idea that "nobody ever gave me anything for free" defines not only Marian's life strategy, but also his politi- Marian: In terms of refugees, this is also much pumped up balloon. My opinion on this topic is that in general our current government behaves in such a way that here they do not want them yyy, but this is due to what terms they would come here on…They have to work…They have a different culture, but I do not know, because of that they can come maybe not in such a big group as they would like to, we know that in Germany this is at the moment a big disaster what is happening. Because now it is difficult to find a true German there. There are many Poles, many Turks, many... And because of that, that even these people later come, become a minor... became a majority in the country and yyy. I will be the host of the country, living as a true citizen, yyy, later I have no rights, because I suddenly become a minority. So I am this way.
But, I have nothing against refugees as such, a family may come, but work here, not get everything for free, because we the nationals in Poland get nothing for free. In any case, I do not respect Poles, yy who live somewhere on benefits, you know…And it is good taking benefits. I hate, hate parasites.
In the arguments of Marian, we can find a lot of statements which are pretty typical of far-right discourse.
By defining himself as "not a strong racist," he represents a pattern of "the denial of racism" (van Dijk 1992; Kajta 2017). He gives an example of his good relations with a dentist, who is Arab (who "speaks Polish" and "does his job very well"). More generally speaking, he does not see himself as a radical right supporter. He says that he did not go to the last Inde- Recalling school time, Sven feels his needs and interests were not addressed. After being diagnosed highly skilled "in artistic sense," he changes to a special school-later re-changing to the old one, as the situation did not improve. Eventually, he drags himself through school, he never has good grades, and feels continuously socially isolated. Compensation for this situation is brought by his father's garage, where he finds room to play, tinker, and try out constructions of weapons-not with straightforward lethal interest, but for engineering, technical reasons. He ("just barely") manages to receive a lower secondary school degree, but feels disoriented after school. His parents then pay for vocational training as a gunsmith. Having completed education, he first starts working as a salesman for interiors and some other, mostly unregistered jobs. His motivation to start working points to his critical attitude towards the idea of being welfare-dependent (similarly to Marian). After some time in several jobs, he manages to get a job as a gunsmith, but loses it due to problems with police (indicated through friends who pulled him into their trouble). Being banned to work as a gunsmith until his record is cleaned, he starts a job via temporary agency in the electronics industry, which he very much criticizes. He perceives it not only as a form of "modern slavery," but also a government strategy to get "nice numbers,"
to "push our problems away" in order to pretend progress. However, disliked temporary work functions as a stepping stone to hired employment. He is able to negotiate a real work contract and in addition to his job in the semi-conductors' plant, he starts working as a consultant for airsoft guns in a friend's company. He finishes his extempore narration by emphasizing his professional advancement and available opportunities.
Similarly to Marian, but differently from Marianna and Johanna, Sven's story is predominantly work-centered. Asked about his life beyond work, Sven mentions good contact with his parents, but almost no relations with his brother who stole some money from his father. He does not have too many good contacts with friends either. For a hobby, beyond airsoft, he also did combat sports, football, lifting, and engages as a scout enjoying the work with the children. His dream is to "start a family sometime," which he wants to be able to provide for and have "basically a little bit of square life," again pointing to common for all four cases aspiration to "normality." Sven does not mention any relationships, but says of himself that he is rather shy towards women and has difficulties to express his feelings.
Sven frames his story in terms of the contradiction between his own biographical projects and the constraints imposed by the institutional world. The tension is firstly mentioned at the beginning of the interview and continues throughout the entire story.
The extempore narration is centered on the history of becoming a gunsmith and being temporarily ex- but I was afraid that they would become too strong.
Because as an opposition, I like them. I think they're dumb as a party. Well, they're partially just airheads. Having an ironic attitude to AfD and defining himself as "definitely" not "racist" ("because I've been dealing with foreigners all my life...So racist is just plain stupid"), even though with a "slight right tendency," he still thinks that political correctness in Germany is something covering some real problems, including the problems with multiculturalism.
Asked about refugees, he answers that the problem was created by the "stupidity" of German elites who let them in, media which are "causing excitement," and reluctance of international political community to intervene in Syria. From this perspective, the refugee crisis is interpreted in anti-systemic language as another way of "keeping nations divided" to help rule them by policy-makers. Sven is, in principle, not against helping refugees, but rather "in their home country": Based on his own school experiences and reference to one of the German politics, he also points out that the potential of conflict is an unavoidable part of multicultural society and refers to a concrete situation in his former school: Sven: Helmut Schmidt once said that, uh, integration is really important, but you have to be careful out of, uh, that the cultures don't differ too much, because it offers too much potential for conflict and can destroy a lot. And that's just in many areas, right now I'm saying my former school was closed because the teachers couldn't deal with the students anymore. There was the case, for example, where a teacher had made an announcement to a Turkish pupil, something because he had beaten a girl. Then the Turkish pupil spat on the teacher and then she just rebuked him, gave him a bad mark and the like.
That evening the father of the guy came along, he gives the teacher a slap in the face, for her talking to his son the way she did as a woman. And she was hot no, got no support from the school.
Similarly to Marianna, Sven builds his picture of refugees / other cultures on single experiences and makes that image more general. Not seeing himself as racist or xenophobic, he spends quite some time on criticizing religious fundamentalism and sees himself "as not a fan of religion, no matter which one," since religion is seen by him as another (and the oldest) form of mass control. In fact, the main driver of his turn to the right-wing populist party voting seems to be related much less to some authoritarian traits (though, his criticism of democracy can indicate them) as to his individualistic critique of the dominance of any kind of system on individuals framed in a similar fashion like in the case of Marian. For instance, based on his own experiences, he is very critical of the education system in Germany and would like his future children to get access to education promoting "their own interests," much more individually oriented. The public sphere, in such a view, is itself a part of the system and is not treated as a serious arena of decision-making, since the real decisions are made in the backstage, by corrupt elites and hyper-influential media.
Conclusions
In this article, we posed a question about the biographical sources of the support for right-wing populist parties granted by some young people in Poland and Germany. From a sample of biographical narrative interviews with young people in both countries who experienced various short-term and temporary forms of employment, we draw four cases of right-wing supporters. Our goal was to explore the relationship between their biographical experiences and their political views. Interestingly enough, despite the objective differences in narrators' economic and cultural resources, their biographical accounts shared some common characteristics. Firstly, the political views did not explicitly emerge in the course of extempore narratives, but they were discussed in the third part of interviews: sometimes just briefly (as in the case of Marianna) and sometimes with passion and at length (as in the case of Marian and Sven). It confirms that political identities, even those related to rather extreme views, do not need to be at the center of broader biographical identity of young people pointing to their general distance and distrust of politics (Szafraniec et al. 2017) . Secondly, similarly to earlier studies (e.g., van Dijk 1992; Kajta 2017), in the case of interviews with right-wing supporters we observed various strategies of rhetorical mitigation of own prejudices towards cultural Others, such as Muslims, refugees, or homosexuals.
For instance, anti-refugee statements were accompanied by irony or hesitation, which can point both to their relatively weak anchoring in the narrators' personal identities and communicative situation of interviews in which extreme views were seen as better to be avoided, in line with the interpretations suggested by the "denial of racism" hypothesis.
Even though it would be misleading to define any direct, causal relationship between biographical experiences and the emergence of right-wing views, our analysis allows us to reconstruct some case-specific explanations and, perhaps, some more abstract and general observations. All four narrators present- Secondly, a comparative analysis of precarious and non-precarious right-wing supporters, as well as between precarious supporters of other political forces would be helpful to understand better why certain individuals experience a turn to the right while the majority still abstains from far right support.
